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SECTIONS 8(b)(4) AND 303: INDEPENDENT REMEDIES
AGAINST UNION PRACTICES UNDER THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT*
WHEN Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act,' a principal aim was to curb
union practices considered injurious to employers and the public.2 To achieve
this end, two similarly worded sections forbid labor organizations to engage
in or encourage certain types of secondary concerted activities and jurisdic-
tional strikes, or to strike against an employer when the NLRB has certified
another union as the bargaining agent for his employees.2 Section 303 gives
*International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp.,
72 Sup. Ct 235 (1952).
1. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141
et seq. (Supp. 1951). Section 1 amended the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449
(1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946). For legislative history of the Act, see NLRB, LEGiS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MAACALGaSiE RELATIONs AcT (1948).
2. SEN. RuE. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1947).
3. Section 303 (a) of the Act reads:
"It shall be unlawful, for the ptrposes of this section only, in an industry or activity
affectlng commerce, for any labor organization to engage in, or to induce or encourage
the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course
of their employment to use ... or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities
or to perform any services, where an object thereof is-
"(1) forcing or requiring any employer or other self-employed person to juin any labor
or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, hand-
ling, transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person;
. "(2) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees unless such organization has been
certified as the representative of such employees under provisions of section 9 of the
National Labor Relations Act;
"(3) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor
organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has been
certified as the representative of such employees under provisions of section 9 of the
National Labor Relations Act;
"(4) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a
particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to em-
ployees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft or class unless such
employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the National Labor Relations
Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work.
'.." 61 STAT. 136, 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (Supp. 1951) (emphasis added).
Except as indicated by the words italicized, Section 8(b) (4) follows the wording in
Section 303(a), 61 STAT. 141-2 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. 1951).
Secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes were not prohibited by the Wagner Act:
nor were there any defined union unfair labor practices, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1946). Secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes were in fact immune from
injunctions in the federal courts uider the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932),
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a private party injured by such conduct the right to sue the union for damages 4
in federal or state courts,5 and to obtain a jury trial on the issue. Section 8
(b) (4), by classifying these activities as unfair labor practices, empowers the
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1946) ; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (no jurisdiction
to enjoin a jurisdictional strike and picketing in support) ; Taxi-cab Drivers Local v.
Yellow Cab Operating Co., 123 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1941) (no jurisdiction to enjoin a
secondary boycott). Previously, jurisdictional strikes, secondary boycotts, and secondary
picketing were readily enjoinable under the common law as illegal conspiracies, and also
in the federal courts, under the anti-trust laws. See MILLIS & BROWN, FROMa THE WA Nant
AcT To TAFT-HARTLEY 7-15, 460-61 (1950). Damage actions were likewise available, but
rarely instituted. Id. at 496-7.
For the history and development of state statutes paralleling the federal law, see Kill-
ingsworth, Restrictive State Labor Relations Acts, [1947] Wis. L. REv. 546; Millis &
Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legislation 1937-47, 15 U. OF CHI. L. Rsv. 282 (1948) "
Comment, Current Legislative and Judicial Restrictions on State Labor Injunction Acts,
53 YALE L.J. 553 (1944).
4. Section 303 was introduced specifically to give persons injured by the activity
described in Section 8(b) (4) a right to sue for damages in the courts. See CONFERENCE
Conm'rT REPORT, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT 67 (1947), and explanation
of Senator Taft, 93 CONG. REc. 4858 (1947). The court's jurisdiction under Section 303
is restricted to determination of damages. No incidental injunction can be granted. Dixie
Motor Coach Corp. v. Amalgamated Association, 170 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1948) ; Textile
Workers v. Amazon Cotton Mills, 167 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1948).
5. Section 303(b) gives a person injured in his "business or property" a right to
sue in "any district court of the United States or any court having jurisdicition of the
parties." 61 STAT. 159 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (Supp. 1951). The federal courts of
the territories were held covered by the grant of jurisdiction. International Longshore-
men's and Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 72 Sup. Ct. 235, 239 (1952).
State courts apparently may also hear the damage suit. See WOLLErT, LAnoR RELATIOrNS
AND FEDERAL LAW 121 (1949); TELLER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR DisPuTms
§398.171 (Supp. 1950).
The jurisdiction conferred on the courts by Section 303(b) is further subject "to the
limitations and provisions of § 301." Section 301 removes the usual $3,000 minimum
federal requirement to bring suits in the district courts and the need for diversity of
citizenship in breach of contract suits by and against unions. In addition, Section 301
details the union's capacity to sue; it restricts money judgments against unions to their
assets; and it defines the jurisdiction of the courts and the method of service of process.
The requirement that the parties be involved in an industry affecting commerce is ncces-
sarily retained. 61 STAT. 156-7 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. 1951). All these .iurisdlc-
tional provisions are apparently carried over to Section 303. Schatte v. International Alli-
ance, 182 F.2d 158, 165 (9th Cir. 1950), reversing 84 F. Supp. 669, 673 (S.D. Cal. 1949),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950) (diversity of citizenship not necessary in Section 303
suit); Note, 59 YALE L. J. 575 (1950). See International Longshoremen's and Ware-
housemen's .Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 72 Sup Ct. 235, 238 (1952).
6. Section 8(b) (4) conduct is made "an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
tion or its agent." 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1951).
Sub-sections (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Section 303(a) correspond to (A), (B), (C)
and (D) in Section 8(b) (4).
For informative material on the various sub-sections of 8(b) (4) see MILLIs & BRowN,
FROM THE WAGNER Act TO TAFT-HARTLEY 455-581 (1950); WERNE, LAW OF LABOR 4R.-
[Vol. 61
NOTES
NLRB to issue cease and desist orders against violators,- to assign work in
jurisdictional disputes," and to seek temporary injunctions against the pro-
scribed practices in the federal courts) But in providing different forums and
remedies for the same wrongs, Congress failed to indicate what relationship
if any, actions under the two sections should have.
LATioNs 237-42 (1951); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Mana:iemnent Relations Act.
1947, 61 HARv. L. Rm,. 1, 24-8 (1947) ; Dennis, The Boycott Under The Taft-ffartlev
Act. 3 N.Y.U. ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON L.o 367 (1950); Developnents in the Law-
The Taft-Hartlel, Act. 64 HARv. L. REv. 781. 794-810 (1951); Comment, 50 MTi. L.
REv. 315 (1951).
7. The NLRB is empowered under Section 10(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act to issue
cease and desist orders when it finds an unfair labor practice in a hearing held pursuant to
Section 10(b). The Board, further, has power to "take affirmative action . . . to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act." 61 STAT. 147 (1947). 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) and (c) (Supp.
1951).
8. Whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that a jurisdictional dispute
exists within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (D), the NLRB is instructed by Section
10(k) to hear and determine the dispute unless within ten days the Tarties can arrive
at a voluntary adjustment. The Board's Regional Director, however, may make a pre-
liminary investigation to determine whether there is a prima facie case. Herzog v.
Parsons, 181 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
The Board will in all cases conduct a Section 10(k) hearing before a full dress 10(b)
hearing will be held. Consequently an appeal cannot be taken to the courts unless the
Section 10(k) award is violated and the 10(b) hearing is conducted. The award then
is not a "final order" in the fullest sense. Winslow Bros. & Smith Co., 90 N.LR.B. 1379
(1950) ; Juneau Spruce Corp., r2 N.L.R.B. 650 (1949) and 90 N.L.R.B. 1753 (1950):
Stroh Brewery Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 844 (1950) ; Ship Sealing Contractors Ass'n., 37 N.L.
R.B. 92 (1949); Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co., S2 N.L.R.B. 916 (1949); Moore Drydock
Company, 81 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1949). For a general treatment of the functions of Section
10(k) see MiLus & BROWN, FROMs THE WAGNER ACTr To TAr-HAnTLE" 474 (1950):
WEiuq,, LAW OF L. oR RmATIONS 241-2 (1951).
9. The Board's Regional Directors must petition the Federal Courts for a temporary
injunction, whenever they have reasonable grounds to believe the acts violative of Sec-
tions 8(b) (4) (A), (B), (C), and in appropriate instances (D), have occurred. Sections
10(j) and (1), 61 STAT. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(j), (1) (Supp. 1951) ; see, e.g.,
Douds v. Wine, Liquor Distilling Workers' Union, 75 F.Supp. 447, 449 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
A private individual however, is still barred by the Norris-LaGuardia Act from going
directly into the Federal Courts for relief against non-violent union activity in connection
with labor disputes. Bakery Sales Drivers' Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, 333 U.S.
437, 442 (1948). He can act only through the Board.
The courts do not automatically grant the injunctions. They may require any of the
traditional grounds for issuing injunctions: irreparable loss, harm to the public, strwng
necessity, etc. See Le Baron v. Los Angeles Building and Constructing Trades Council,
84 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd. 181 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1949); Elliutt v. Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters, 91 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Brown v. Retail She &
Textile Salemen's Union, 89 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1950); and Douds v. Wine, Liquor
Distilling Workers' Union, 75 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. N.Y. 1948). For a review of cases
under Section 10(l) see, Blumenthal, Mandatory Injunctions and the NLRB, 2 LA. L
J. 7 (1951).
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In International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Jun cau
Spruce Corp.'0 the Supreme Court first considered the possible bearing of
8(b) (4) proceedings on suits under Section 303. The corporation had won
a $750,000 jury verdict in federal court against the union for damages re-
sulting from a jurisdictional strike. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,"1 and cer-
tiorari was granted. The union argued, inter alia, that a jurisdictional strike
does not violate 8(b) (4) until the NLRB has made a finding that the strik-
ing union is not entitled to the work. Reasoning that a strike cannot offend
303 unless it also violates 8(b) (4), the union insisted that damages, if any,
should be computed only from the date of the NLRB determination.1 2 The
Supreme Court might have disposed of the Union's argument simply by ril-
ing that violations of 8(b) (4), as well as 303, begin at the date of the strike
rather than at the date of the NLRB decision. But the Court, in affirming
the verdict, rested its decision on a broader ground. It held that Congress
intended the remedies arising from 303 to be "independent" of those tinder
10. 72 Sup. Ct. 235 (1952).
11. 189 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1951).
12. From April 10, 1048 to May 9, 1949, International Longshoremen's picketed
Juneau's plant pursuant to a demand that Juneau bargain with it in regard to assigning
barge loading work. This work Juneau had already assigned to its employees, members
of a woodworkers' union, under an existing contract. The woodworkers agreed, at least
temporarily, that Juneau should reassign the work to members of International. As a
result International's picket line was honored and the plant was shut down. Extensive
boycotting was also undertaken by International, and this effectively ended Juneau's
operation.
On August 3, 1948, Juneau had filed a complaint alleging a violation of 8(b) (4) (D)
with the NLRB. The Board held a 10(k) hearing on April 1, 1949. This resulted
in a finding that International was not entitled to the work. But International continued
its picketing until May 9-37 days beyond the date of the 10(k) award.
Juneau had, in the meantime, instituted a suit under 303 in the District Court of
Alaska. Juneau demanded $750,000 damages covering its losses over the entire period of
the picket. International contended that the most Juneau could receive was an amount
covering damages sustained during the thirty-seven days International had violated the
Section 10(k) award. For it argued that the Board has not considered Section 8(b) (4)
(D) violated until there has been a violation of the award in the Section 10(k) hearing;
consequently, in view of the identity of the proscribing language in Sections 8(b) (4) (D)
and 303(a) (4), there could not be a violation of Section 303(a) (4) until there had been
a Section 10(k) hearing. Juneau refuted this argument on the basis of congressional
intent to keep the two remedies independent.
The NLRB submitted an amnicis brief to the Supreme Court. The Board disputed
International's initial premise that no violation of Section 8(b) (4) (D) can occur until
an award had been made under Section 10(k). It pointed out that it was only when rea-
sonable grounds to believe that Section 8(b) (4) (D) has, in fact, been violated that a
Section 10(k) hearing is conducted. Section 10(k) the Board views only as a procedural
limitation designed to eliminate the delay involved in a full-dress Section 10(b) hearing
of an 8(b) (4) (D) unfair labor practice. The Board expressed no opinion as to whether
this procedural requirement carried over to the courts under Section 303. For a summary
of the arguments before the Supreme Court, see 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3149 (Dec. 11, 1951).
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8(b) (4) (D),'" and that administrative action by the NLRB is not a pre-
requisite to a damage suit.1 4 While only the jurisdictional dispute subsections
were directly construed, this holding clearly covers 303 and 8t b) (4) in their
entirety.
Complete independence of 8(b) (4) and 303 may well prove undesirable.
Since the language in the two sections is notoriously confusing,15 an NLRB
case and a private damage suit arising from the same or like events may
easily have opposite outcomes. Thus, in one case a victorious union found
itself liable for damages in a 303 suit for engaging in the same activities
13. "The fact that the two sections (§§ 8(b) (4) (D) and 303(a) (4)) have an identity
of language and yet specify two different remedies is strong confirmation of our conclusion
that the remedies provided were to be independent." International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 72 Sup. Ct. 235, 239 (1952) (emphasis
added).
Senator Ball introduced what is now Section 303 before the Senate sitting as a Com-
mittee of the Whole. Section 8(b) (4) had already been reported out of Committee and
discussed by the Senate. 93 ConG. REC. 4757 (1947). The Ball propusal contained in addi-
tion to the damage remedy a provision for injunctive relief which met with much opposi-
tion. Accordingly Senator Taft offered to substitute the present form of Section 403,
which is, essentially, the Ball amendment without the injunction provision. 93 CoNc. REc.
4770 (1947). The Ball and Taft versions were, then, discussed jointly. Reference to
"direct access" to the courts cropped up frequently, but focused primarily on the injunc-
tion provision of the Ball version. See, e.g.. 93 ConG. REc. 4836-7 (1947).
Senator Ball's version was defeated. 93 CoNG. REc. 4849 (1947). The Taft amend-
ment alone was then before the Senate; reference to "direct suit" was made only once
in a vague way while the Taft version was discussed. 93 CoN. REv. 4858 (1947).
Primary emphasis in the whole debate on Section 303 was on the deterrent effect that
the damage suit would have. Ibid.
See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor lanagencnt Relations Act, 1407, 61 HAv. L
REv. 144 (1947) (suggestion that the Taft-Hartley Act was particularly plagued by the
"manufacture of 'legislative history'" and "legislation not suggested by the bill" through
the various reports and debates).
14. "Certainly there is nothing in the language of § 303 (a) (4) which makes its
remedy dependent on any prior administrative determination that an unfair labor practice
has been committed. Rather, the opposite seems to be true." International Longshoremen's
and Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 72 Sup. Ct. 235, 239 (1952).
15. Professors Millis and Brown describe the language as "extremely complex, tech-
nical and difficult." Miu.is & BRow.z, op. cit. supra note 6, at 456. Consequently precedent
under the two Sections has been difficult to manage. For example, the process of inter-
pretation of the boycott language in Sections 8(b) (4) (A) and 303(a) (1) has been one
of restricting the almost all-encompassing language of the Act by referring to congres-
sional intent to proscribe only what at common law were "secondary" boycotts as distin-
guished from "primary." The characteristics of the outlawed activity now seem to be
something between a literal reading of the Act and the common law, with considerable
emphasis being placed on motive and situs of the dispute. See NLRB v. International
Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951) ; NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) ; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 341 U.S.
695 (1951) ; Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL v.
NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951). See also Johns, Picketing and Secondary Boycotts Under the
Taft-Hartley Act, 2 LAB. L. J. 257, 263-9 (1951) ; Koretz, Federal Rcgulation of Second-
1952]
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which were sanctioned by the Board.1 6 Similarly, an employer who has col-
lected in a damage suit may be unable to secure a Board cease and desist
order against continuance of conduct found illegal by a judge or jury. Resolu-
tion of these conflicting interpretations by reviewing courts would not neces-
sarily occur. 17 As a result, precedent is likely to become confused, and unions
will be offered little guidance as to what constitutes permissible or prohibited
conduct under the Act.
ary Strikes and Boycotts-A New Chapter, 37 CORN. L. Q. 235 (1952) ; Comment, 50
MicE. L. Rrv. 315 (1950).
It may well be doubted that a jury could understand fine distinctions made by charges
conforming to the rules laid down in these cases. Furthermore, Section 8(b) (4) (A) In-
volves refinements which will offer both judge and jury considerable trouble. E.g., Douds
v. Metropolitan Association, etc., 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) (privileging union
activity against an "ally" of the primary employer). See also WERNE, op. cit. supra note
6, at 237-42; WoLLEir, op. cit. supra note 5, at 88-98; Developments in the Law--The
Taft-Hartley Act, 64 HARv. L. REv. 781, 794-810 (1951) (difficulties of 8(b) (4) analyzed).
16. In the matter of Deana Artware, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 732 (1949), reheard, 28 LAD.
RE. REla. MAN. 1271, 95 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (1951). The Board twice found that a picket by
the union of a warehouse on the Corporation's property was not a violation of Section 8
(b) (4). Nevertheless, a jury trial under Section 303 resulted in a verdict and judgment
for $29,000 damages. The Section 303 case is unreported, but is now before the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Brief for Appellants, pp. 45-6, United Brick & Clay
Workers of America v. Deane Artware, Inc., Civil Action No. 11403 (5th Cir. 1952).
The possibility of such conflict and its bad effects were brought out in the Senate
debates: "I cannot be convinced that it is sound legislation to disperse the authority over
these problems, to draw into the orbit of their handling, a host . . . of Federal judges
without competence in the field or, by splitting up authority among all the district judges
of the land, to make impossible the development of a uniform body of precedent and
decisions, harmoniously integrated with each other over the entire economy." Senator
Morse, 93 CONG. REG. 5043 (1947).
The dispersion of authority in the Act has been severely criticized by leading experts
in the field. See 2 TELLER, LABoR DISPUTES AND COLLECTVF, BARGAINING § 398.171 (Supp.
1950) ; Van Arkel, Administrative Law and the Taft-Hartley Act, 27 ORE. L. Rv. 171,
180-2 (1948).
Of course conflict between the courts and the Board is most likely to arise in applying
the Act to different facts. Conflict of statutory interpretation will be less dramatic but
equally troublesome.
17. In. theory, reviewing courts and one Supreme Court can harmonize interpre-
tations of the law and reverse either the trial court or the NLRB for errors. But, in fact,
insulation afforded lower tribunals' findings of facts and inferences allowable from con-
troverted evidence may prevent resolution.
Findings of Federal' trial judges sitting without juries are not to be reversed unless
"clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). And the findings of facts and inferences made
by the NLRB are conclusive "if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole." Section 10(1), 61 STAT. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)(Supp. 1951). While
this provision gives more scope to review than under the Wagner Act, the reviewing
court has less power than it has under the "clearly erroneous" rule. See Jaffe, Judicial
Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 HARV. L. REv. 1233, 1245-6
(1951). Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 484-5 (1950) (Justice Frank-
furter detailing the legislative history of the "substantial evidence" test). The jury ver-
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To ensure uniformity in analogous situations where Congress has set up
an administrative agency to handle the special problems of industries the
Supreme Court has frequently invoked a so-called "primary jurisdiction"
rule."' Under this doctrine the Court requires preliminary resort to the agency
as a prerequisite to instituting a court suit, even where the court action would
appear to be entirely independent of the administrative process.a° Typically,
dit, once evidence is introduced to support an inference, cannot be reversed except on
questions of law, although some broader scope of review may now be indicated. See, eog.,
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R.. 340 U.S. 573 (1951).
For an example of how presumptitns allowed lower tribunals may foil res,,lution
although the facts of twro cases are indistinguishable, see J,,hn Kelley CL,. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue; Talbot Mills v. Same. 326 U.S. 521 (1946) (Tax Court Cases).
Supreme Court resolution of conflicting decisions may Af course be prevented by denial
of certiorari. See Harper & Etherington, lI:at the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the
1950 Tcrm-, 100 U. OF PA. L REv. 354 (1951).
18. The primary jurisdiction rule has been varously termed "preliminary resirt,"
"prior resortf' and "exclusive administrative jurisdicti n." See DAvis, Aomi:;isri wnxvi
LAw 664 (1951) ; Miller, The Necessity for Prelinznary Resort to the Interstate Co;;:-
merce Commnission, 1 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 49 (1932) : Stason, Timing of Judicial Redress
from Erroneous Administrative Action, 25 'MINN. L. REv. 560 (1941) ; Note, 51 HAnv.
L. REv. 1251 (1938).
19. The primary jurisdiction rule in the federal courts had its origin in the Supreme
Court decision of Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.. 204 U.S. 426 11907).
The Oil Co. sued the Railroad to recover monies paid in excess of what it maintained
was a reasonable rate. The Oil Co. had a recognized action under the commn law. The
Interstate Commerce Act provided: "Nothing in this Act contained shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at commun law or by statute, but the pruvi-
sions of this act are in addition to such remedies." 24 STAT. 387 (1857), 49 U.S.C. § 2
(1946). 'Moreover, the Act provided specifically that a choice of forms was upen to injured
parties: "[A]ny person ...claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to
the provisions of this Act may either make complaint to the Commission ... ur may bring
suit in his... own behalf for the recovery of damages for which such commun carrier
may be liable under the provisions of this Act, in any district or circuit court of the
United States'of competent jurisdiction... ;' 24 STr:-. 382 (1K87), 49 U.S.C. §9 (1946).
But despite these clear provisions the Court required the Oil Company to resort to the
Interstate Commerce Comission for its remedy. justification for the decision was that a
series of court determinations would defeat the primary purpose of the Act--consistent
findings of reasonable rates.
The rule in the ICC cases is now fairly well crystallized: When special knowledge
of relevant facts is required, or when the fact situation is so involved as to demand the
agency's special techniques in reporting and hearing cases, then prior resort xill be re-
quired. For an excellent digest of the I.C.C. and other cases on prior resort, see DAvis,
ADMINISTRATvE LAw 666-9 (1951).
The primary jurisdiction rule has been widely applied in administrative law outside
of the ICC rate-making cases. E.g., Slocum v. Delaware L & NV. Ry. Co., 339 U.S.
239 (1949); Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946) (both cases
requiring prior resort to the National Railway Adjustment Board, distinguishing MouLre
v. IlL Central Ry. Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941)) ; United States Navigationt Co. v. Cunard
Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932) (prior resort to Shipping Board) ; Michigan Con-
solidated Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Co., 173 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1949) (inter-
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the doctrine is used when solution of a problem requires the agency's special
knowledge of relevant facts or when the fact situation is considered to be so
complex as to demand the agency's special techniques in hearing and reporting
cases.20 The doctrine 'usually results in dismissal of the court suit unless a
specific issue can be saved for the court after the agency finding.21
The 8(b) (4)-303 situation would have seemed a particularly appropriate
state pipe line case referred to Federal Power Commission). Moreover, the Supreme
Court has indicated the doctrine's applicability to pre-Taft-Hartley NLRB cases. Ro-
chester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 139n.22 (1939)(Justice Frankfurter,
however, citing for the proposition Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41
(1938), a case involving rather the doctrine of "exhaustion of administrative remedies.")
The primary jurisdiction rule, in fact, was argued by counsel for the Union in the
Juneau, case in the opening brief before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit. Brief for Appellants, pp. 53-7, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 189 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1951). But it was dropped. Reply
Brief of Appellants, pp. 12-14, ibid. The doctrine seems irrelevant to the case since at
the time of appeal there were two decisions by the NLRB declaring International's acti-
vity to be violative of Sections 8(b) (4) (D). Juneau Spruce Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 650 (1950)
(10(k) procedure), and 90 N,L.R.B. 753 (1950) (review of Trial Examiner hearing of
8(b) (4) (D)).
The most important recent development in the primary resort rule is its growing use
in anti-trust suits involving industries subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of admihi-
strative agencies. See, e.g., Far East Conference, et at v. United States, 72 Sup. Ct. 492
(1952) (Supreme Court requires prior resort to U.S. Shipping Board in anti-trust
suit brought by the Attorney General) ; S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d
658 (D.C. Cir. 1951) cert. filed 20 U.S.L. WEEx 3212 (Feb. 4, 1952) (private anti-
trust suit referred to the C.A.B.) ; and Note, Judicial Application of Anti-Trust Law to
Regulated Industries, 64 HAxv. L. REv. 1154 (1951). Interestingly enough, Senator Taft
analogized the Section 303 damage suit to the treble damage suit under the anti-trust
law. 93 CONG. Rac. 4872-3 (1947) ("The parallel is exactly the same.").
20. "Preliminary resort to the [Interstate Commerce] Commission is required . ..
because the inquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters; and
uniformity can be secured only if its determination is left to the Commission. Moreover,
that determination is reached ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the
adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with many intricate facts of transportation
is indispensable; and such acquaintance is commonly to be found only in a body of experts,"
Brandeis, J., Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922),
The rule is, however, beset with uncertainties. Compare, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R. R. Co., 340 U.S. 889 (1950) (5 to 4 decision of the Supreme Court denying need for
prior resort in injunction suit under the antitrust laws on the ground that the ICC may
not be able to offer relief sought), with Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134
(1946) (injunction and damage award by state court reversed: primary jurisdiction of the
ICC).
21. See General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S,
422 (1940) (damage suit referred to the ICC but retention on the court's docket ordered
because the court could possibly hear claims arising out of failure to comply with the
Commission's order); S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir.
1951 (anti-trust suit referred to the CAB, but court retains suit on its docket because




one for application of the remedial primary jurisdiction rule. The complicated
fact situations which arise in secondary boycott and jurisdictional dispute
cases require the Board's expert knowledge of labor relations. Proper
evaluation of the cases also demands that familiarity with the bargaining
and business relationships in the plant and industry which only an expert
agency can attain.23 Moreover, the Board's hearing technique seems to ferret
out relevant facts more easily than formalized procedures before a judge or
jury.24 And the detailed NLRB findings provide clearer guides to future
22. Senator 'Morse stated the case for keeping the most important remedies with
the NLRB:
"It has been my consistent endeavor while this legislation has been under discussion
to vest determination ... in a single organization that is expert in labor problems...
Labor problems are complex; as complex indeed as our entire social structure since the
great mass of our people are workers ... Close day-to-day contact with these problems
is necessary if able persons are to keep themselves even reasonably informed." 93 Co.;..
Rac. 4841 (1947).
See also Van Arkel, Administrative Law and the Taff-Hartley Act, 27 Omu. L REv.
171, 180-2 (1948) (criticism of the jurisdictional handling of the two Sections) ; cf. Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1950) (Justice Frankfurter's view of
the Board's expertise).
23. See, e.g., Winslow Bros. & Smith Co., 90 "N.L.R.B. 1379 (1950) (the Board in a
Section 10(k) hearing determined which of two unions was entitled to the work on the
basis of the history of the plant) ; Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 87
N.L.R.B. 755 (1949) (union black-list and "hot cargo" letters privileged under Section 8
(b) (4) (A) because they were traditional weapons used by labor organizations in direct
support of a "primary" labor dispute). Compare Wine, Liquor and Distilling Vorkers'
Union, 78 N.LR.B. 504 (1948), enforced, 178 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1949) (wholesaler not an
"ally" of manufacturer so that union dispute activity against him aimed at forcing him
to boycott manufacturer's goods is an 8(b) (4) (A) unfair labor practice), i'ith Irwin-
Lyons Lumber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949) (lumber company and transport company under
such common stock ownership and managerial control that they were "allies"; hence union
activity against one but aimed at the other is privileged).
For particular difficulties in enforcing 8(b) (4) in the construction industry, see
Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construc ion I:dus-
try,, 60 YALE L.J. 673, 681-9 (1951).
24. "Administrative agencies, in general, are just as painstaking and impartial in
their finding as are courts. They have, in addition, the advantage of expert investigative
staffs to assist in preparing and presenting cases before them. Knowing the characters
and abilities of the men who compose those staffs, they can place in them a degree of
reliance and confidence that a judge cannot place in the opposing advocates on whose
presentation of the evidence he must largely rest his decision. The administrative agency
. .. offers an affirmative and purposeful way of insuring that, to a considerable extent.
the relevant facts will be brought out, the public's interest made clear and justice dune."
FRANx, IF MEx WER ANGELS 146-7 (1942). Cf. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor-
Managemiwnt Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1, 43 (1947).
The techniques of NLRB hearings are briefly examined in WERxN, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 55-6; TI.Em, op. cit. supra note 16, at §§ 203.9-51, and excellently reviewed
in MiLtis & BRowx, op. cit. supra note 6, at 395-419.
For a statement of the multiple advantages of administrative adjudication in regulatory
statutes in general see BLACHLY & OATNIAN. AmI1xismATivE LmisIATvON A:t. Apjvoi-
c.Arox 202-223 (1934).
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conduct than do jury verdicts or many lower court decisions. In addition,
more consistent interpretation of substantive law can be achieved by having
a single body handle all cases.
2
5
Although the Supreme Court declined to apply primary jurisdiction in
Juneau, judicial means to avoid conflict in some cases are still available. In
Section 303 suits involving issues over which the Taft-Hartley Act gives the
NLRB exclusive jurisdiction, such as employer unfair labor practices and
union certification, 26 courts should hold prior determination by the Board on
these issues to be conclusive. If no decision of the Board has been made, the
court could refer those questions to the Board for settlement.2 If such an
issue amounts to a defense of the union's conduct, 28 the court should either
25. The Board is thoroughly conversant with the language of the Sections through
handling a multitude of 8(b) (4) cases. See collection of cases in Develojnents i, the
Law---The Taft-Hartley Act, 64 HAgv. L. REv. 781, 798-810 (1951). The lower Courts
have had few cases under the damage Section. The Labor Management Relations Manual,
for example, reports only four suits under Section 303 in the period from May 1948 to
April 1950. LAB. RI. MAN. Cum. DIGEST AND INDEX § 82.841 (Supp. 1950). As a result,
the Board 'certainly is better equipped to apply precedent to any one case than is any
district court. See note 16 supra.
Conflicting interpretations of the law are less likely in NLRB cases simply because
they all pass through the hands of a single body of experts. See NLRB v. Hearst Publi-
cations, 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1939).
26. It was not the understanding of the Congress that the Board's exclusive juris-
diction over employer unfair labor practices, union certification, the conduct of elections
and choice or bargaining unit were in any way abridged by the Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, 90 (1947) ; SEN. Rm. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1947).
Extension of court jurisdiction beyond the claim for damages in 303 cases has been
justified twice because of the deletion by the Taft-Hartley Amendments of the phrase
"exclusive" in Section 10(a) of the Wagner Act which defines the Board's power over
unfair labor practices. But on both occasions the lower courts were reversed, Textile
Workers v. Amazon Cotton Mills, 76 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. N.C. 1947), rczvd, 167 F.2d
183 (4th Cir. 1948); Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, of Street, Elem.
Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 74 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Ark. 1947), rev'd, 170 F.2d 902
(8th Cir. 1948).
Elimination of "exclusive" from Section 10(a) by the Senate and House Conferees
was solely for the sake of consistency with Senate adoption of the damage suit section
and injunction procedures under Sections 10(j) and (I). H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 52 (1947).
27. Cf. procedure adopted without legislation in Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd. v. Trans-
Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 78 F. Supp. 1, 9 (Hawaii 1948) (Court in anti-trust suit deniles
primary jurisdiction of CAB but reserves right to refer administrative questions to the
agency).
28. A union may set up an employer unfair labor practice as a defense to a charge
of activity proscribed by Section 303 or 8(b) (4). For example, the NLRB assumed, al-
though it did not decide, that an assignment of work by an employer in violation of the
non-discrimination provisions of Section 8(a) (3) privileges union activity which would
otherwise violate Section 8(b) (4). In the matter of William Fargo, 91 N.L.R.B. 1003,
1007 (1950).
Similarly, Board certification of a union is a valid defense to charges of violations of
Sections 303(a) (2) and (3), and in certain instances 303(a) (4).
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stay its proceedings pending the Board decision or make its judgment or jury
verdict contingent on the outcome of the referred defense.
Furthermore, decisions from reviewing courts under one of the similarly
worded sections are applicable as a matter of stare dccisis to interpretations
of the other.29 Hence parties or intervenors in suits under Section 303 might
call the attention of the trial court to the same case, or cases involving similar
facts, pending before the Board or reviewing courts. 0 Then, pursuant to its
power to control its own docket, 31 the court could stay the 303 suit until
the Board case has been fully adjudicated.3 2 While the employer might be
29. See, e.g., Illinois ex re. Gorden v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 366-7 (1946) (de-
cisions under original section of the Social Security Act applicable under substantially the
same section in amended act) ; Kelleher v. United States, S F. Supp. 139 (S.D. N.Y.
1950) (Admiralty Rule 32 being an exact copy of Rule 34. of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, precedent under the latter must be followed in Admiralty cases); but cf.
Bulcke v. Graham, 91 F. Supp. 615, 618 (N.D. Wash. 1949) (A decision as to the right to
assume jurisdiction under Section 303(b) is not stare decisis as to the jurisdiction of the
court to issue an injunction under Section 10(l) of the Taft-Hartley since the wording
of those two Sections is different.).
30. The Court itself may have some difficulty taking notice of judicial proceedings
not immediately before it. 9 WXIGMoRn, EviDmxcE § 2579 (3d ed 1940). But any party to
the suit, an amicus curiae, or an intervenor can call the court's attention to the suit con-
currently being heard. Landis v. North American Company, 299 U.S. 248 (1935) (party
moves for stay); Helmbright v. Hertin, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N.W. 552 (1933) (amicus
brings attention of court to other proceedings) ; Grand Rapids v. Consumers' Power Co.,
216 Mich. 409, 414, 185 N.W. 852, 854 (1921) (intervenor has same rights as a party).
31. See Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); Crancer v. Law-
den, 315 U.S. 631, 636 (1942); Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 332
(1935).
32. Only a final order of the Board on the merits should bind the courts in 303 cases.
The order of the NLRB in a Section 10(b) hearing of an 8(b) (4) (D) complaint is final
and directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 159 (e)
(Supp. 1951). Once appealed the courts in the 303 suit should not be bound until the
case has been decided by the last reviewing court. Such practices would run counter to
the generally accepted rule that a decision is final for the purposes of binding the courts
and administrative bodies as a matter of res judicata or collateral estoppel although it is
still appealable. See RESTATEMENT. JUDGMENTS § 41(d) (1942) ; Reed v. Allen, 2 U.S.
191, 199-200 (1932). But in view of the possibility of reversal on review a delay until the
last appeal is taken seems the wiser practice.
A Section 10(k) hearing award is not technically a final order of the Board, since
it is unreviewable by the courts. Review is only obtainable if the award is violated and
a full-dress 10(b) hearing is held. Consequently it seems undesirable to make the 10(k)
findings binding on the courts.
For examples of court proceedings stayed to await administrative determinations al-
though jurisdiction of the court and agency are recognized as concurrent and separate,
see Leventritt v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 178 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1949) (SEC) ;
United States v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 931 (D. 1950) (ICC);
Woods v. Gates, 8 F. Supp. 867 (D. La. 1950) (Housing Expeditor); Illinois-Iowa
Power Co. v. North American Light and Power Co., 49 F. Supp. 277 (D. Del. 1943)
(SEC) ; cf. Crancer v. Lawden, 315 U.S. 631, 636 (1942) (power acknowledged, but sta:.
denied).
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harmed by this delay, the uniformity of interpretation achieved by the stay
order device should be an overriding consideration.
83
To ensure effective and certain integration in all cases, however, congres-
sional action is necessary. Congress should amend the Taft-Hartley Act to
require prior resort to the Board in all Section 303 suits, or, at least, make
such resort a discretionary matter for the trial court when the facts appear
to require the expert opinion of the Board. As to what weight the courts
should give NLRB decisions in referred cases or in cases originating with
the Board, Congress has several alternatives. The most extreme would make
all such decisions absolutely binding on the courts. Thus, a final order by
the Board finding no violation of 8(b) (4) would result in dismissal of the
303 action; a finding of an 8(b)(4) violation would leave only the question
of damages in the 303 suit. While this proposal would ensure complete uni-
formity, it might encourage an employer initially seeking only a Board cease
and desist order to take his NLRB verdict to the court to collect damages, or
to use the possibility of such action as a bargaining weapon. But in view of
the unpopularity of damage litigation against unions, it is unlikely that an
employer not already bent on suing the union will embark on a course which
will further strain his labor relations and may cause local public censure.
8 4
33. The stay order is an equitable remedy. See MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 28 (2d ed.
1948). In regard to the problem of integration of the NLRB orders and Section 303
damage suits, the problem for the court is to balance the public interest in obtaining uni-
formity against any inconvenience or expenses caused by the delay to the parties.
The stay may certainly be granted if the point of law decided by the NLRB case will
result in dismissal of the 303 suit. Landis v. North American Company, 299 U.S. 248
(1936), noted, 46 YALE L.J. 897 (1937).
Clarification of the law for the judge to apply, or for his charge to the jury could be
a sufficient reason. See, Landis v. North American Co., supra, at 254; Mottolese v. Kauf-
man, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Coyne & Delaney Co. v. G. W. Orthank, 90 F. Supp.
505, 506-8 (S.D. Iowa 1950); Dederrick v. North American Co., 48 F. Supp. 410, 412
(D.D.C. 1945) ; Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 524 (S.D. N.Y. 1942). The Federal
Courts have regularly stayed proceedings to permit state courts to clarify the state laws
applicable to the federal cases. Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 (1949) ; Meredith v. Win-
ter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
Identity of parties is a relevant consideration, because a party may conceivably be
prejudiced .by a proceeding before the Board at which it could not examine witnesses
or argue on appeal. See Landis v. North American Co., supra; Note, 47 YALE L. J. 799,
802-3 (1938).
The timing of the suits is a further consideration, which may however, always be out-
weighed by others. E.g., Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, 91 F.
Supp. 106, 108 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) ; P. Buersdorf & Co. v. Duke Laboratories, 92 F. Supp.
287, 288 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
34. The paucity of litigation under 303 has been generally attributed to the unwill-
ingness of employers to strain union relationships. The cease and desist order is of course
a less inflammatory proceeding than the attack on the union treasury. Furthermore, since
the employer would still be required to show causal connection between the violation
and the jury, a brake on litigation would remain. See Developments in the Lau--The
Taft-Hartley Act, 64 HARv. L. REv. 781, 847 (1951).
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Methods of integration short of giving NLRB determinations a full binding
effect are also available. The court could be given discretion to request an
advisory opinion of the NLRB as to whether the union conduct is illegal?0
Or the NLRB decision could be introduced in the 303 suit as prima facie
evidence of all matters determined and essential to the prior adjudication-
a technique similar to that available for treble damage plaintiffs under Section
5 of the Clayton Act after a successful government antitrust suit.0 Another
possibility is to have the Board's decision conclusive on the district courts
as to the issues of fact decided if supported by "substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole."37 The issue of damages would remain solely
for judge or jury determination if the union were found to have violated the
prohibited activities.
Congress should start examination of these alternatives immediately. In
view of the desirability of furthering harmonious employer-union relation-
ships, it is questionable whether the Act should permit the heavy damage suits
possible under 303 at all.3s But it is clear that revision of the sections pro-
cedurally-whatever their merit substantively-is definitely in order to
eliminate the difficulties which have been and will continue to be caused
by keeping them independent.
35. See In re Chicago Rys. Co., 160 F.2d 59. 68-9 (7th Cir. 1947), cerl. der:ied, 331
U.S. 808 (1947) (court at its discretion accepts SEC advice under Ch. X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 890-1 (1938). 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1946)).
See also 38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 47 (1946) (Attorney General may refer cases
brought by him under the anti-trust laws to the FTC: FTC findings are admitted as a
master's report in equity except that the court may reject the whole or a part of the
report as the nature of the case requires.).
36. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16(5) (1946) (decree in guverument anti-trust
suit admissible in evidence and constitutes a prima facie case in private anti-trust suit).
See Note, Clayton Act, Section 5: Aid to Treble Damage Suitors?, 61 YAJE LJ. 417
(1952).
Unless there is direct legislative sanction, an administrative order which would not
have res judicata or collateral estoppel effects would be inadmissible in evidence. Bruns-
wick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling & Billiard Corp., 150 F.Zd 69, 74 (2d
Cir. 1945) (FTC order not admissible in anti-trust litigation) ; accord, International Tag
and Salesbook Co. v. American Salesbook Co., 6 F.R.D. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); and
Proper v. John Bene and Sons, 295 F. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
37. See scope of review under Section 10(1) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 143
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (Supp. 1951). In view of the Board's special qualifications
giving its opinion such force in 303 suits seems warranted. Cf. Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Central-Ill. Securities Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949) (SEC approval of re-
organization binding on District Courts when supported by substantial evidence) ; Eckers
v. Western Pacific P_ R, 318 U.S. 448, 467 et seq. (1943) (ICC approval of rates bind-
ing on courts if plan approved conforms to provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act
and is fair and equitable).
38. See discussion, 93 CoNG. RE. 4 39-40 (1947).
